


#### Satellites & The EU Regulatory Framework

### ESOA Market Access & Regulatory Working Group


Brussels, 30 April 2008

Coord-markets@esoa.net www.esoa.net



- ITU Relations
- Service Neutrality
- Technology Neutrality
- Licenses
  - Review
  - Fees
  - Regimes
  - Harmonisation
- EU selection process
- Co-ordination with other regulatory bodies





- The ITU-R regulations for international rights & technical rules apply especially to the satellite sector
- The ITU system of registering orbital slots & associated frequencies:
  - Should not be compromised
  - Works well through the role of managing administration of a MS
- Concerning the ITU allocation table:
  - Frequencies should be assigned according to this (note that Art 4.4 is intended for use in exceptional & limited cases only)
  - Respect the frequency band classification (exclusive, shared)
  - Align definitions (e.g. 40 radiocoms services are defined in art 1 of RR & 30 appear in the Frequency allocation table
  - Consistency regarding service category (primary/ secondary) including protection of future stations
- National managing administrations have a crucial role to play





#### **ESOA** favours:

- Explicit reference to the ITU framework in order to demonstrably ensure consistency of EC actions
- A consolidated approach, lead by ITU definitions & principles with additional EU definitions for electronic communications services
- A continued role for ITU national competency for MS that are the managing administrations



### Service & Technology Neutrality (I)

#### Service Neutrality (SN)

- Applies to electronic communications services, but should not override "Services" as defined within ITU categories;
- Service Neutrality is a totally independent concept from technology neutrality (e.g. Triple Play to Homes, Telephony & Broadband to mobile users)

#### Technology neutrality (TN)

 Applying identical rules to different technologies creates the risk that the effect of the rules is different between the technology

#### ESOA's understanding of these concepts

Aim is to achieve equivalent treatment between technologies

Application should not harm interference environment for other services



### Service & Technology Neutrality (II)


#### **ESOA** therefore favours:

- Additional language to clarify interpretation & application of these concepts
- Exception to the technology neutrality principle for reasons of compliance with international obligations or standards related to the use of frequencies
- Exclusion of change of use compared to the Frequency Allocation Table in case of spectrum trading
- Explicit recognition of the need for technical rules to protect satellite services against interference



# Risks of Imposing unlimited TN Example I: C-Band

Satellite Space-to-Earth links share frequency bands in Europe with terrestrial services but under specific conditions that prevent harmful interference to the often less strong satellite signals




The C band satellite service has always shared with terrestrial fixed links by a process of coordination between radio stations

The planned Broadband Wireless Access service, in the band 3.4 - 3.8 GHz, poses a threat to satellite services, due to the proposed change of technology in the band to wide-area terrestrial systems



# Risks of Imposing unlimited TN Example II: Ku-Band



Satellite services in Ku band share with terrestrial fixed links in the band 10.7 - 11.7 GHz. However the introduction of (i) more intensive use & (ii) higher power by the terrestrial service poses a threat to Direct-To-Home reception of TV signals from satellites.



# Other Considerations In Imposing Neutrality: - Shrinking Satellite Spectrum - Identical Rules

#### Satellite spectrum in Europe is shrinking

- Unlike for terrestrial services, satellite access to spectrum requires international harmonisation: this necessarily places satellite at a disadvantage when competing for spectrum
- In Europe, the terrestrial mobile sector sees disproportionate gains
- Large amounts of spectrum of the satellite sector are assigned to terrestrial services in the name of flexibility (in UHF TV, S, L or C Bands)
- Newly available spectrum (e.g. digital dividend) is not made accessible for satellite services

Application of identical rules to terrestrial & satellite technologies does not have the same impact on both

It has in effect severely limited spectrum access for satellite services

Unequal access to spectrum shows this policy is not technology neutral & impacts competition in Europe



## Other Considerations In Imposing Neutrality: - License Reviews

#### Re-assessment of existing rights of use

#### Satellites:

- Deliver international services
  - → Re-assessment of national licences means a massive cost/ administrative burden
- Require huge upfront investment amortized over periods up to 20 years
  - → Re-assessment threatens sunk costs & denies operators the legitimate & equal right to realise a return
- Are based on a 15-20 year business plan:
  - → A 5 year review introduces substantial, detrimental business uncertainty

Competing communications technologies & services do not have these features which are unique to satellite technology

The application of this process is therefore not neutral & as such should be reassessed



## Other Considerations In Imposing Neutrality: - License Fees

#### **Fees**

- 'All shall pay fees' is not necessarily consistent with equal treatment
- Consistency is needed between numbering & spectrum fees only the former recognizes fees are not always needed

#### Recommendation

Maintain the principle that fees are not required where only minimal risk of harmful interference or no scarcity exists


Introduce the same limiting language for spectrum fees as for numbering fees



## License Regimes/ Review/ Harmonisation - General Authorisation

#### General Authorisation

- Has consistently been favoured by the satellite industry as the most appropriate licensing regime for satellite services
- Member States should impose minimal conditions since the risk of harmful interference is minimized following international co-ordination
- Combination of ITU co-ordination & light licensing regimes plus free circulation of terminals reduces the need for individual grants of use as well as for pan-European selection



# License Regimes/ Review/ Harmonisation - Commission Selection Process

#### **Commission Selection Process**

- EU harmonisation of general authorisation regimes & conditions is totally distinct from any EU selection process
- Transnational services are not necessarily pan-European
- Pan-European selection should be strictly limited to very rare occasions
- Consistency in terminology & interpretations by ECJ is required on concepts of transnational/ pan-European/ cross border services

#### Recommendation

Lightest touch regulation for satellite services with minimal EU/ MS intervention only as necessary to control interference

Extension of certain aspects of the Services Directive (2006/123) to electronic communications: "mutual recognition of documentation" is particularly suited to the satellite sector



### Coordination with other Regulatory Bodies

- Existing bodies have proven their efficiency & adaptability (e.g. to EU enlargement)
  - System of mandates to CEPT works relatively well
- A complex institutional framework adds substantial administrative cost, delay & risk to already complicated co-ordination procedures
- Industry consultation is crucial
- Transparency & broader public participation in Committees

#### **Recommendations of Satellite Operators**

- Avoid overlaps & duplication between CEPT & EU maintain consistency with CEPT undergoing reform
- Establish clear roles & responsibilities between institutions (including CoCom, RSPG, RSCom
- Affirm the duty to take into account industry views & comments including a "reply round"
- Allow stakeholders to participate or at least observe Committee meetings